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While Britain’s decision to leave the EU has been framed as a negative development for the
integration process, some observers have argued that it could allow the other member states to
pursue closer integration in the UK’s absence. Catherine De Vries writes that although previous
crises have indeed generated signiﬁcant leaps forward in European integration, the opposition
evident in the UK also exists in other EU countries and it is diﬃcult to imagine that greater
integration will counter this growing Euroscepticism.
After the shock of the British referendum on EU membership last week, many pointed to a possible
silver lining for the EU. Brexit could spark oﬀ further integration among the 27 member states that remain. The
political paralysis that has emerged following the Eurozone and refugee crisis, characterised by fundamentally
divergent thinking about further integrative steps in Europe’s national capitals, could give away to a more
coordinated and European approach.
Comments by Xavier Bettel, the prime minister of Luxembourg, at the intergovernmental conference held in Brussels
following the result of the UK’s referendum reﬂected this view: “We have more need than ever for a united Union
rather than a disunited Kingdom.” Will Brexit prove to be a unifying moment for Europe?
We of course lack a crystal ball, and at present there are
so many parts moving simultaneously that it is diﬃcult to
judge what the implications of the United Kingdom’s exit
will be for Europe. Yet, we could speculate based on what
we know about the integration process in the past. There
have been numerous moments of crisis in the European
integration process, and even some where single
member states turned their back on Europe (albeit exit
was not in the cards), such as the ‘empty chair crisis’ in
the 1960s.
As a response to the proposal of making the European
Commission a more powerful body, the French
government under President Charles De Gaulle withdrew
from the Council, leaving an empty chair at the
negotiation table. France voted twice in EU referendums
in 1963 and 1967. This time of political stalemate was resolved by an expansion of intergovernmental decision-
making within the EU and a veto right for countries for all issues of ‘vital national interest’ (the so-called Luxembourg
compromise), but it also led to more integration through other means. It shifted the focus of integration to legal
matters, and was associated with an enormous push in economic and political integration through the establishment
of the principles of direct eﬀect and supremacy of EU law (over national law).
Whether the current crisis surrounding the Brexit result could also push the EU forward, by further ﬁnancial and
economic integration of the Eurozone for example, is debatable. Many things have changed between then and now.
My ongoing research (here and here) suggests that questions about more or less integration have become
enormously contested and are now part-and-parcel of domestic party competition and elections. Unlike the 1960s,
further integrative steps cannot be pushed forward without closely calculating the costs of domestic electoral fallout.
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Although mainstream politicians might hope that the immediate ﬁnancial and economic pain suﬀered by the UK
since the Brexit vote deters the success of Eurosceptic parties, this deterrence eﬀect is most likely short-lived. The
concerns of ordinary voters, who are often opposed to the EU because of concerns about intra-EU immigration,
austerity or opaque EU institutions remain unchanged. Further steps of integration across the continent will not be
perceived to beneﬁt those who feel that they are left behind and their children face limited prospects of upward
mobility.
Eurosceptic parties across the EU mobilise these concerns eﬀectively and will reap the electoral beneﬁts, as they
have done in the past. This is also in part a result of the deep internal divisions that government parties face about
Europe. National governmental leaders who in the European Council need to decide on the long term direction of
the integration process are not insulated in Brussels, they face the continued pressure to be re-elected and Europe
is not popular at the ballot box. Expecting these politicians to motor on ahead in Europe seems unrealistic.
Next to the intricate connection that has grown between EU politics and incumbent electoral success, another factor
makes the current situation stand out. The Eurozone crisis has uncovered an enormous rift between member states.
Europe’s citizens are deeply divided when it comes to EU policy preferences. My research suggests that
Eurosceptics in the North are primarily worried about intra-EU migration, while in the South ﬁscal austerity and
widespread unemployment has led people to discontent with the lack of intra-EU ﬁscal solidarity and the absence of
EU-wide transfers.
It seems hard to ﬁnd a coordinated European solution to satisfy both constituencies simultaneously, especially in the
short run. Whereas the introduction of transfers would require a transfer of policy competences to the EU level, the
restriction of migration would violate one of the core principles of integration, namely the free movement of people.
Whereas transfers are electorally unpopular in the North, restriction to intra-EU migration is in the South (and East).
Although it is possible to strike a balance between both demands by introducing some sort of transfer mechanism
that would address structural imbalances in the Eurozone and as such limit the demand for migration in the future,
this would be costly and the fruits of such reforms may only come to bear decades from now. Given the importance
of EU matters for the re-election of national governments, current incumbents will most likely focus on their short-
term political survival. The making and breaking of political careers post-Brexit will be a gentle reminder. Against this
backdrop, muddling through will be the most likely response.
The problem with a possibly lackluster response to the grave economic, political and social problems facing the EU
today will be that it allows Eurosceptics to keep using Brussels as an eﬀective punch bag to reap electoral gains.
The continued success of Eurosceptics again limits the room to manoeuvre for national governments at the
European level. Although Brexit constitutes a possible integrative moment for Europe, it is doubtful that it can break
the downward spiral of Euroscepticism.
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